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Abstract—E-voting systems have emerged as a powerful tech-
nology for improving democracy by reducing election cost, in-
creasing voter participation, and even allowing voters to directly
verify the entire election procedure. Prior internet voting systems
have single points of failure, which may result in the compromise
of availability, voter secrecy, or integrity of the election results.
In this paper, we present the design, implementation, security
analysis, and evaluation of D-DEMOS, a complete e-voting system
that is distributed, privacy-preserving and end-to-end verifiable.
Our system includes a fully asynchronous vote collection subsys-
tem that provides immediate assurance to the voter her vote was
recorded as cast, without requiring cryptographic operations on
behalf of the voter. We also include a distributed, replicated and
fault-tolerant Bulletin Board component, that stores all necessary
election-related information, and allows any party to read and
verify the complete election process. Finally, we also incorporate
trustees, i.e., individuals who control election result production
while guaranteeing privacy and end-to-end-verifiability as long
as their strong majority is honest.
Our system is the first e-voting system whose voting operation
is human verifiable, i.e., a voter can vote over the web, even when
her web client stack is potentially unsafe, without sacrificing
her privacy, and still be assured her vote was recorded as cast.
Additionally, a voter can outsource election auditing to third
parties, still without sacrificing privacy. Finally, as the number
of auditors increases, the probability of election fraud going
undetected is diminished exponentially.
We provide a model and security analysis of the system. We
implement a prototype of the complete system, we measure its
performance experimentally, and we demonstrate its ability to
handle large-scale elections.
I. INTRODUCTION
E-voting systems have emerged as a powerful technology to
improve the election process. Kiosk-based e-voting systems,
e.g., [12], [15], [25], [13], [10], [22] allow the tally to be
produced faster, but require the voter’s physical presence at
the booth. Internet e-voting systems, e.g., [20], [8], [16], [30],
[26], [33], [12], [13], [33], [28], however, allow voters to cast
their votes remotely. Internet voting systems have the potential
to improve the democratic process by reducing election costs
and by increasing voter participation for social groups that
face considerable physical barriers and overseas voters. In
addition, several internet voting systems [8], [30], [33], [28]
allow voters and auditors to directly verify the integrity of the
entire election process, providing end-to-end verifiability. This
is a highly desired property that has emerged in the last decade,
where voters can be assured that no entities, even the election
authorities, have manipulated the election result. Despite their
potential, existing internet voting systems suffer from single
points of failure, which may result in the compromise of voter
secrecy, service availability, or integrity of the result [12], [15],
[25], [13], [10], [20], [8], [16], [30], [26], [33], [28].
In this paper, we present the design and prototype imple-
mentation of D-DEMOS, a distributed, end-to-end verifiable
internet voting system, with no single point of failure during
the election process (that is, besides setup). We set out to over-
come two major limitations in existing internet voting systems.
The first, is their dependency on centralized components. The
second is their requirement for the voter to run special software
on their devices, which processes cryptographic operations.
Overcoming the latter allows votes to be cast with a greater
variety of client devices, such as feature phones using SMS, or
untrusted public web terminals. Our design is inspired by the
novel approach proposed in [28], where the voters are used
as a source of randomness to challenge the zero-knowledge
protocols, which are used to enable end-to-end verifiability.
We design a distributed vote collection subsystem that is
able to collect votes from voters and assure them their vote
was recorded as cast, without requiring any cryptographic
operation from the client device. This allows voters to vote
via SMS, a simple console client over a telnet session, or
a public web terminal, while preserving their privacy. At
election end time, vote collectors agree on a single set of
votes asynchronously, and upload it to a second distributed
component, the Bulletin Board. This is a replicated service
that publishes its data immediately and makes it available to
the public forever. Our third distributed subsystem, trustees
are a set of persons entrusted with secret keys that can unlock
information from the bulletin board. We share these secret keys
among them, making sure that an honest majority is required
to uncover information from the BB. Trustees interact with the
BB once the votes are uploaded to it, to produce and publish
the final election tally.
The resulting voting system is end-to-end verifiable, by
the voters themselves, as well as third-party auditors; all
this while preserving voter privacy. A voter can provide an
auditor information from her ballot; the auditor can read
from the distributed BB and verify the complete process,
including the correctness of the election setup by election
authorities. Additionally, as the number of auditors increases,
the probability of election fraud going undetected diminishes
exponentially.
Finally, we implement a prototype of the complete D-
DEMOS voting system. We measure its performance exper-
imentally, under a variety of election settings, demonstrating
its ability to handle thousands of concurrent connections, and
thus manage large-scale elections.
To summarize, we make the following contributions:
• We present the world’s first complete, state-of-the-art,
end-to-end verifiable, distributed voting system with no
single point of failure besides setup.
• The system allows voters to verify their vote was tallied-
as-intended without the assistance of special software
or trusted devices, and external auditors to verify the
correctness of the election process. Additionally, the
system allows voters to delegate auditing to a third party
auditor, without sacrificing their privacy.
• We provide a model and a security analysis of our voting
system.
• We implement a prototype of the integrated system,
measure its performance and demonstrate its ability to
handle large scale elections.
II. RELATED WORK
Voting systems. Several end-to-end verifiable e-voting sys-
tems have been introduced, e.g. the kiosk-based systems [15],
[25], [13], [10] and the internet voting systems [8], [30], [33],
[28]. In all these works, the Bulletin Board (BB) is a single
point of failure and has to be trusted.
Dini presents a distributed e-voting system, which however
is not end-to-end verifiable [23]. In [22], there is a distributed
BB implementation, also handling vote collection, according
to the design of the vVote end-to-end verifiable e-voting
system [21], which in turn is an adaptation of the Preˆt a` Voter
e-voting system [15]. In [22], the proper operation of the BB
during ballot casting requires a trusted device for signature
verification. In contrast, our vote collection subsystem is done
so that correct execution of ballot casting can be “human
verifiable”, i.e., by simply checking the validity of the obtained
receipt. Additionally, our vote collection subsystem is fully
asynchronous, always deciding with exactly n−f inputs, while
in [22], the system uses a synchronous approach based on the
FloodSet algorithm from [31] to agree on a single version of
the state.
DEMOS [28] is an end-to-end verifiable e-voting system,
which introduces the novel idea of extracting the challenge of
the zero-knowledge proof protocols from the voters’ random
choices; we leverage this idea in our system too. However,
DEMOS uses a centralized Election Authority (EA), which
maintains all secrets throughout the entire election procedure,
collects votes, produces the result and commits to verification
data in the BB. Hence, the EA is a single point of failure,
and because it knows the voters’ votes, it is also a critical
privacy vulnerability. In this work, we address these issues
by introducing distributed components for vote collection and
result tabulation, and we do not assume any trusted component
during election. Additionally, DEMOS does not provide any
recorded-as-cast feedback to the voter, whereas our system
includes such a mechanism. Besides, DEMOS encodes the i-
th option to N i−1, where N is greater than the total number of
voters, and this option encoding has to fit in the message space
of commitments. Therefore, the size of the underlying elliptic
curve grows linearly with the number of options, which makes
DEMOS not scalable with respect to the number of options.
In this work, we overcome this problem by using a different
scheme for option encoding commitments. Moreover, the zero-
knowledge proofs in DEMOS have a big soundness error, and
it decreases the effectiveness of zero-knowledge application;
whereas, in our work, we obtain nearly optimal overall zero-
knowledge soundness.
Furthermore, none of the above works provide any perfor-
mance evaluation results.
State Machine Replication. Castro et al. [11] introduce a
practical Byzantine Fault Tolerant replicated state machine
protocol. In the last several years, several protocols for
Byzantine Fault Tolerant state machine replication have been
introduced to improve performance ([19], [29]), robustness
([9], [18]), or both ([17]). Our system does not use the state
machine replication approach, as it would be more costly. Each
of our vote collection nodes can validate the voter’s requests
on its own. In addition, we are able to process multiple
different voters’ requests concurrently, without enforcing the
total ordering inherent in replicated state machines. Finally,
we do not want voters to use special client-side software to
access our system.
III. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
A. Problem definition and goals
We consider an election with a single question and m
options, for a voter population of size n, where voting takes
place between a certain begin and end time (the voting hours),
and each voter may select a single option.
Our major goals in designing our voting system are three.
First, it has to be end-to-end verifiable, so that anyone can ver-
ify the complete election process. Additionally, voters should
be able to outsource auditing to third parties, without revealing
their voting choice. Second, it has to be fault-tolerant, so that
an attack on system availability and correctness is hard. Third,
voters should not have to trust the terminals they use to vote,
as they may be malicious; voters should be assured their vote
was recorded, without disclosing any information on how they
voted to the malicious entity controlling their device.
B. System overview
We employ an election setup component in our system,
which we call the Election Authority (EA), to alleviate the
voter from employing any cryptographic operations. The EA
is tasked to initialize all remaining system components, and
then gets destroyed to preserve privacy. The Vote Collection
(VC) subsystem collects the votes from the voters during
election hours, and assures them their vote was recorded-as-
cast. Our Bulletin Board (BB) subsystem, which is a public
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repository of all election related information, is used to hold
all ballots, votes, and the result, either in encrypted on plain
form, allowing any party to read from it and verify the
complete election process. The VC subsystem uploads all
votes to BB at election end time. Finally, our design includes
trustees, who are persons entrusted with managing all actions
needed until result tabulation and publication, including all
actions supporting end-to-end verifiability. Trustees hold the
keys to uncover any information hidden in the BB, and we
use threshold cryptography to make sure a malicious minority
cannot uncover any secrets or corrupt the process.
Our system starts with the EA generating initialization data
for every component of our system. The EA encodes each
election option, and commits to it using a commitment scheme,
as described below. It encodes the i-th option as ~ei, a unit
vector where the i-th element is 1 and the remaining elements
are 0. The commitment of an option encoding is a vector
of (lifted) ElGamal ciphertexts [24] over elliptic curve, that
element-wise encrypts a unit vector. Note that this commitment
scheme is also additively homomorphic, i.e. the commitment
of ea + eb can be computed by component-wise multiplying
the corresponding commitments of ea and eb. The EA then
creates a votecode and a receipt for each option. Then, the
EA prepares one ballot for each voter, with two functionally
equivalent parts. Each part contains a list of options, along
with their corresponding vote codes and receipts. We consider
ballot distribution to be outside the scope of this project, but
we do assume ballots, after being produced by the EA, are
distributed in a secure manner to each voter; thus only each
voter knows the vote codes listed in her ballot. We make sure
vote codes are not stored in clear form anywhere besides the
voter’s ballot.
Our Vote Collection (VC) subsystem collects the votes from
the voters during election hours, by accepting up to one vote
code from each voter. Our EA initializes each VC node with
the vote codes and the receipts of the voters’ ballots. However,
it hides the vote codes, using a simple commitment scheme
based on symmetric encryption of the plaintext along with
a random salt value. This way, each VC node can verify if a
vote code is indeed part of a specific ballot, but cannot recover
any vote code until the voter actually chooses to disclose it.
Additionally, we secret-share each receipt across all VC-nodes
using a (N − f,N)-VSS scheme with trusted dealer, making
sure that a receipt can be recovered and posted back to the
voter only when a strong majority of VC nodes participates
successfully in our voting protocol. With this design, our
system adheres to the following contract with the voters: Any
honest voter who receives a valid receipt from a Vote Collector
node, is assured her vote will be published on the BB, and thus
included in the election tally.
The voter selects one part of her ballot at random, and posts
her selected vote code to one of the VC nodes. When she
receives a receipt, she compares it with the one on her ballot
corresponding to the selected vote code. If it matches, she is
assured her vote was recorded and will be included in the
election tally. The other part of her ballot, the one not used
for voting, will be used for auditing purposes. This design
is essential for verifiability, in the sense that the EA cannot
predict which part a voter may use, and the unused part will
betray a malicious EA with 1/2 probability per audited ballot.
Our second distributed subsystem is the Bulletin Board
(BB), which is a replicated service of isolated nodes. Each BB
node is initialized from the EA with vote codes and associated
option encodings in committed form (again, for vote code
secrecy), and each BB node provides public access to its stored
information. On election end time, VC nodes run our Vote Set
Consensus protocol, which guarantees all VC nodes agree on
a single set of voted 〈serial-no, vote-code〉 tuples. Then, VC
nodes upload this set to each BB node, which in turn publishes
this set once enough VC nodes provide the same set.
Our third distributed subsystem is a set of trustees, who are
persons entrusted with managing all actions needed until result
tabulation and publication, including all actions supporting
end-to-end verifiability. Secrets that may uncover information
in the BB are shared across trustees, making sure malicious
trustees under a certain threshold cannot disclose sensitive in-
formation. We use Pedersen’s Verifiable linear Secret Sharing
(VSS) [32] to split the election data among the trustees. In a
(k, n)-VSS, at least k shares are required to reconstruct the
original data, and any collection of less than k shares leaks no
information about the original data. Moreover, Pedersen’s VSS
is additively homomorphic, i.e. one can compute the share of
a+ b by adding the share of a and the share of b respectively.
Using this scheme allows trustees to perform homomorphic
“addition” on the option-encodings of cast vote codes, and
contribute back a share of the opening of the homomorphic
“total”. Once enough trustees upload their shares of the “total”,
the election tally is uncovered and published at each BB node.
Note that, to ensure voter privacy, the system cannot reveal
the content inside an option encoding commitment at any
point. However, a malicious EA might put an arbitrary value
(say 9000 votes for option 1) inside such a commitment,
causing an incorrect tally result. To prevent this, we utilize
the Chaum-Pedersen zero-knowledge proof [14], allowing the
EA to show that the content inside each commitment is a
valid option encoding, without revealing its actual content.
Namely, the prover uses Sigma OR proof to show that each
ElGamal ciphertext encrypts either 0 or 1, and the sum of
all elements in a vector is 1. Our zero knowledge proof is
organized as follows. First, the EA posts the initial part of
the proofs on the BB. During the election, each voter’s A/B
part choice is viewed as a source of randomness, 0/1, and all
the voters’ coins are collected and used as the challenge of
our zero knowledge proof. After that, the trustees will jointly
produce the final part of the proofs and post it on the BB
before the opening of the tally. Hence, everyone can verify
those proofs on the BB. For notation simplicity, we omit the
zero-knowledge proof components in this paper and refer the
interested reader to [14] for details.
Due to this design, any voter can read information from the
BB, combine it with her private ballot, and verify her ballot
was included in the tally. Additionally, any third-party can
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read the BB and verify the complete election process. As the
number of auditors increases, the probability of election fraud
going undetected diminishes exponentially. For example, even
if only 10 people audit, with each one having 12 probability
to detect ballot fraud, the probability of ballot fraud going
undetected is only 12
10
= 0.00097. Thus, even if the EA is
malicious and, e.g., tries to point all vote codes to a specific
option, this faulty setup will be detected because of the end-
to-end verifiability of the complete system.
C. System and threat model
We assume a fully connected network, where each node can
reach any other node with which it needs to communicate.
The network can drop, delay, duplicate, or deliver messages
out of order. However, we assume messages are eventually
delivered, provided the sender keeps retransmitting them.
For all nodes, we make no assumptions regarding processor
speeds. We assume the clocks of VC nodes are synchronized
with real time; this is needed simply to prohibit voters from
casting votes outside election hours. Besides this, we make
no other timing assumptions in our system. We assume the
EA sets up the election and is destroyed upon completion of
the setup, as it does not directly interact with the remaining
components of the system, thus reducing the attack surface for
the privacy of the voting system as a whole.We also assume
initialization data for every system component is relayed to
it via untappable channels. We assume the adversary does
not have the computational power to violate any underlying
cryptographic assumptions. To ensure liveness, we additionally
assume the adversary cannot delay communication between
honest nodes above a certain threshold. We place no bound
on the number of faulty nodes the adversary can coordinate,
as long as the number of malicious nodes of each subsystem is
below its corresponding fault threshold. We consider arbitrary
(Byzantine) failures, because we expect our system to be
deployed across separate administrative domains.
Let Nv, Nv, and Nt be the number of VC nodes, BB nodes,
and trustees respectively. The voters are denoted by Vℓ, ℓ =
1, . . . , n. We assume that there exists a global clock variable
Clock ∈ N, and that every VC node, BB node and voter X is
equipped with an internal clock variable Clock[X ] ∈ N. We
define the two following events on the clocks:
(i). The event Init(X) : Clock[X ] ← Clock, that initializes
a node X by synchronizing its internal clock with the
global clock.
(ii). The event Inc(i) : i ← i + 1, that causes some clock i
to advance by one time unit.
All system particpants are aware of a value Tend such that
for each node X , if Clock[X ] ≥ Tend, then X considers that
the election has ended.
The adversarial setting for A upon D-DEMOS is defined
in Figure 1. The description in Figure 1 poses no restrictions
on the control the adversary has over all internal clocks, or
the number of nodes that it may corrupt (arbitrary denial of
service attacks or full corruption of D-DEMOS nodes are
possible). Therefore, it is necessary to strengthen the model
The adversarial setting.
1) The EA initializes every VC node,BB node, trustee of
the D-DEMOS system by running Init(·) in all clocks
for synchronization. Then, EA prepares the voters’
ballots and all the VC nodes’, BB nodes’, and trustees’
initialization data. Finally, it forwards the ballots for
ballot distribution to the voters Vℓ, ℓ = 1, . . . , n.
2) A corrupts a fixed subset of VC nodes, a fixed subset
of BB nodes, and a fixed subset of trustees. In addition,
it defines a dynamically updated subset of voters Vcorr,
initially set as empty.
3) When an honest node X wants to transmit a message
M to an honest node Y , then it just sends (X,M, Y )
to A.
4) A may arbitrarily invoke the events Inc(Clock) or
Inc(Clock[X ]), for any node X . Moreover, A may
write on the incoming network tape of any honest
component node of D-DEMOS.
5) For every voter Vℓ, A can choose whether it is going
to include Vℓ in Vcorr.
(i). If Vℓ ∈ Vcorr, then A fully controls Vℓ.
(ii). If Vℓ /∈ Vcorr, then A may initialize Vℓ by
running Init(Vℓ) only once. If this happens, then
the only control of A over Vℓ is Inc(Clock[Vℓ])
invocations. Upon initialization, Vℓ engages in
the voting protocol.
Figure 1. The adversarial setting for the adversary A acting upon the
distributed bulletin board system.
so that we can perform a meaningful security analysis and
prove the properties (liveness, safety, end-to-end verifability,
and voter privacy) that D-DEMOS achieves in Section IV.
Namely, we require the following:
1) Fault tolerance: We consider arbitrary (Byzantine) fail-
ures. For each of the subsystems, we have the following fault
tolerance thresholds:
Let Nv, Nv, and Nt be the number of VC nodes, BB nodes,
and trustees respectively. The voters are denoted by Vℓ, ℓ =
1, . . . , n. For each of the subsystems, we have the following
fault tolerance thresholds:
• The number of faulty VC nodes, fv, is strictly less than
1/3 of Nv , i.e., for fixed fv:
Nv ≥ 3fv + 1.
• The number of faulty BB nodes, fb, is strictly less than
1/2 of Nv , i.e., for fixed fb:
Nb ≥ 2fb + 1.
• For the trustees’ subsystem, we apply ht out-of Nt
threshold secret sharing, where ht is the number of honest
trustees, thus we tolerate ft = Nt−ht malicious trustees.
2) Liveness assumptions: Only for the liveness of our
system, we need to ensure eventual message delivery and
bounded synchronization loss. Therefore, it is necessary, to
make the following assumptions:
Assumption I: There exists an upper bound δ on the time
that A can delay the delivery of the messages between honest
nodes. Formally, when the honest node X sends (X,M, Y )
to A, if the value of the global clock is T , then A must
write M on the incoming network tape of Y by the time that
Clock = T + δ.
Assumption II: There exists an upper bound ∆ of the drift
of all honest nodes’ internal clocks with respect to the global
clock. Formally, we have that: |Clock[X ] − Clock| ≤ ∆ for
every node X , where | · | denotes the absolute value.
D. Election Authority
EA produces the initialization data for each election entity
in the setup phase. To enhance the system robustness, we let
the EA generate all the public/private key pairs for all the
system components (except voters) without relying on external
PKI support. We use zero knowledge proofs to ensure the
correctness of all the initialization data produced by the EA.
Voter ballots. The EA generates one ballot ballotℓ for each
voter ℓ, and assigns a unique 64-bit serial-noℓ to it. As shown
below, each ballot consists of two parts: A and B. Each part
contains a list of m 〈vote-code, option, receipt〉 tuples, one
tuple for each election option. The EA generates the vote-
code as a 160-bit random number, unique within the ballot,
and the receipt as 64-bit random number.
serial-noℓ
Part A
vote-codeℓ,1 optionℓ,1 receiptℓ,1
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
vote-codeℓ,m optionℓ,m receiptℓ,m
Part B
vote-codeℓ,1 optionℓ,1 receiptℓ,1
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
vote-codeℓ,m optionℓ,m receiptℓ,m
BB initialization data. The initialization data for all BB
nodes is identical, and each BB node publishes its initializa-
tion data immediately. The BB’s data is used to show the
correspondence between the vote codes and their associated
cryptographic payload. This payload comprises the committed
option encodings, and their respective zero knowledge proofs
of valid encoding (first move of the prover), as described
in section III-B. However, the vote codes must be kept
secret during the election, to prevent the adversary from
“stealing” the voters’ ballots and using the stolen vote codes
to vote. To achieve this, the EA first randomly picks a
128-bit key, msk, and encrypts each vote-code using AES-
128-CBC with random initialization vector (AES-128-CBC$)
encryption, denoted as [vote-code]msk. Each BB is given
Hmsk ← SHA256(msk, saltmsk) and saltmsk, where saltmsk
is a fresh 64-bit random salt. Hence, each BB node can be
assured the key it reconstructs from VC key-shares (see below)
is indeed the key that was used to encrypt these vote-codes.
The rest of the BB initialization data is as follows: for
each serial-noℓ, and for each ballot part, there is a shuffled
list of
〈
[vote-codeℓ,πX
ℓ
(j)]msk, payloadℓ,πX
ℓ
(j)
〉
tuples, where
πXℓ ∈ SL is a random permutation (X is A or B).
(Hmsk, saltmsk)
serial-noℓ
Part A
[vote-codeℓ,πA
ℓ
(1)]msk payloadℓ,πA
ℓ
(1)
.
.
.
.
.
.
[vote-codeℓ,πA
ℓ
(m)]msk payloadℓ,πA
ℓ
(m)
Part B
[vote-codeℓ,πB
ℓ
(1)]msk payloadℓ,πB
ℓ
(1)
.
.
.
.
.
.
[vote-codeℓ,πB
ℓ
(m)]msk payloadℓ,πB
ℓ
(m)
We shuffle the list of tuples of each part to ensure voter’s
privacy. This way, nobody can guess the voter’s choice from
the position of the cast vote-code in this list.
VC initialization data. The EA uses an (Nv − fv, Nv)-
VSS to split msk and every receiptℓ,j , denoted
as (‖msk‖1, . . . , ‖msk‖Nv) and (‖receiptℓ,j‖1, . . . ,
‖receiptℓ,j‖Nv). For each vote-codeℓ,j in each ballot, the EA
also computes Hℓ,j ← SHA256(vote-codeℓ,j , saltℓ,j), where
saltℓ,j is a 64-bit random number. Hℓ,j allows each VC
node to validate a vote-codeℓ,j individually (without network
communication), while still keeping the vote-codeℓ,j secret.
To preserve voter privacy, these tuples are also shuffled using
πXℓ . The initialization data for V Ci is structured as below:
‖msk‖i
serial-noℓ
Part A
(Hℓ,πA
ℓ
(1), saltℓ,πA
ℓ
(1)) ‖receiptℓ,πA
ℓ
(1)‖i
.
.
.
.
.
.
(Hℓ,πA
ℓ
(m), saltℓ,πA
ℓ
(m)) ‖receiptℓ,πA
ℓ
(m)‖i
Part B
(Hℓ,πB
ℓ
(1), saltℓ,πB
ℓ
(1)) ‖receiptℓ,πB
ℓ
(1)‖i
.
.
.
.
.
.
(Hℓ,πB
ℓ
(m), saltℓ,πB
ℓ
(m)) ‖receiptℓ,πB
ℓ
(m)‖i
Trustee initialization data. The EA uses (ht, Nt)-VSS to
split the opening of encoded option commitments Com(~ei),
denoted as (
[
~ei
]
1
, . . . ,
[
~ei
]
Nt
). The initialization data for
Trusteei is structured as below:
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serial-noℓ
Part A
Com(~eπA
ℓ
(i))
[
~eπA
ℓ
(i)
]
ℓ
· · · · · ·
Part B
Com(~eπB
ℓ
(i))
[
~eπB
ℓ
(i)
]
ℓ
· · · · · ·
Similarly, the state of zero knowledge proofs for ballot
correctness is shared among the trustees using (ht, Nt)-VSS.
Due to space limitation, we omit the detailed description here
and refer the reader to [14].
E. Vote Collectors
VC is a distributed system of Nv nodes, running our
voting and vote-set consensus protocols. VC nodes have pri-
vate and authenticated channels to each other, and a public
(unsecured) channel for voters. The algorithms implement-
ing our voting protocol are presented in Algorithm 1. For
simplicity, we present our algorithms operating for a single
election. The voting protocol starts when a voter submits
a VOTE〈serial-no, vote-code〉 message to a VC node. We
call this node the responder, as it is responsible for deliv-
ering the receipt to the voter. The VC node confirms the
current system time is within the defined election hours,
and locates the ballot with the specified serial-no. It also
verifies this ballot has not been used for this election,
either with the same or a different vote code. Then, it
compares the vote-code against every hashed vote code in
each ballot line, until it locates the correct entry. At this
point, it multicasts an ENDORSE〈serial-no, vote-code〉 mes-
sage to all VC nodes. Each VC node, after making sure
it has not endorsed another vote code for this ballot, re-
sponds with an ENDORSEMENT〈serial-no, vote-code,sigVCi〉
message, where sigVCi is a digital signature of the spe-
cific serial-no and vote-code, with V Ci’s private key. The
responder collects Nv − fv valid signatures and forms a
uniqueness certificate UCERT for this ballot. It then ob-
tains, from its local database, the receipt-share correspond-
ing to the specific vote-code. Then, it marks the ballot as
pending for the specific vote-code. Finally, it multicasts
a VOTE P〈serial-no, vote-code, receipt-share, UCERT〉 mes-
sage to all VC nodes, disclosing its share of the receipt. In
case the located ballot is marked as voted for the specific
vote-code, the VC node sends the stored receipt to the voter
without any further interaction with other VC nodes.
Each VC node that receives a VOTE P message, first
verifies the validity of UCERT, and validates the received
receipt-share according to the verifiable secret sharing scheme
used. Then, it performs the same validations as the responder,
and multicasts another VOTE P message (only once), disclos-
ing its share of the receipt. When a node collects hv = Nv−fv
valid shares, it uses the verifiable secret sharing reconstruction
algorithm to reconstruct the receipt (the secret) and marks the
ballot as voted for the specific vote-code. Additionally, the
responder node sends this receipt back to the voter.
The formation of a valid UCERT gives our algorithms the
following guarantees:
a) No matter how many responders and vote codes are active
at the same time for the same ballot, if a UCERT is formed
for vote code vca, no other uniqueness certificate for any
vote code different than vca can be formed.
b) By verifying the UCERT before disclosing a VC node’s
receipt share, we guarantee the voter’s receipt cannot be
reconstructed unless a valid UCERT is present.
At election end time, each VC node stops processing EN-
DORSE, ENDORSEMENT, VOTE and VOTE P messages,
and follows the vote-set consensus protocol, by performing
the following steps for each registered ballot:
1) Send ANNOUNCE〈serial-no, vote-code,UCERT〉 to all
nodes. The vote-code will be null if the node knows of
no vote code for this ballot.
2) Wait for Nv−fv such messages. If any of these messages
contains a valid vote code vca, accompanied by a valid
UCERT, change the local state immediately, by setting
vca as the vote code used for this ballot.
3) Participate in a Binary Consensus protocol, with the
subject “Is there a valid vote code for this ballot?”. Enter
with an opinion of 1, if a valid vote code is locally known,
or a 0 otherwise.
4) If the result of Binary Consensus is 0, consider the ballot
not voted.
5) Else, if the result of Binary Consensus is 1, consider the
ballot voted. There are two sub-cases here:
a) If vote code vca, accompanied by a valid UCERT is
locally known, consider the ballot voted for vca.
b) If, however, vca is not known, send a RECOVER-
REQUEST〈serial-no〉 message to all VC
nodes, wait for the first valid RECOVER-
RESPONSE〈serial-no, vca,UCERT〉 response,
and update the local state accordingly.
Steps IV-B-2 ensure used vote codes are dispersed across
nodes. Recall our receipt generation requires Nv − fv shares
to be revealed by distinct VC nodes, of which at least Nv−2fv
are honest. Note that any two Nv − fv subsets of Nv have at
least one honest node in common. Because of this, if a receipt
was generated, at least one honest node’s ANNOUNCE will
be processed by every honest node, and all honest VC nodes
will obtain the corresponding vote code in these two steps;
thus, they enter step 3 with an opinion of 1. In this case,
binary consensus is guaranteed to deliver 1 as the resulting
value (because all honest nodes share the same opinion), thus
safeguarding our contract against the voters. In any case, step
3 guarantees all VC nodes arrive at the same conclusion, on
whether this ballot is voted or not.
In the algorithm outlined above, the result from binary
consensus is translated from 0/1 to a status of “not-voted”
or a unique valid vote code, in steps 4-IV-B. The 5b case of
this translation, in particular, requires additional justification.
Assume, for example, that a voter submitted a valid vote code
vca, but a receipt was not generated before election end time.
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In this case, an honest vote collector node V Ci may not be
aware of vca at step 3 , as steps IV-B-2 do not make
any guarantees in this case. Thus, V Ci may rightfully enter
consensus with a value of 0. However, when honest nodes’
opinions are mixed, the consensus algorithm may produce any
result. In case the result is 1, V Ci will not possess the correct
vote code vca, and thus will not be able to translate the result
properly. This is what our recovery sub-protocol is designed
for. V Ci will issue a RECOVER-REQUEST multicast, and
we claim that another honest node, V Ch exists that possesses
vca and replies with it. The reason for the existence of an
honest V Ch is straightforward and stems from the properties
of the binary consensus problem definition. If all honest nodes
enter binary consensus with the same opinion a, the result of
any consensus algorithm is guaranteed to be a. Since we have
an honest node V Ci, that entered consensus with a value of
0, but a result of 1 was produced, there has to exist another
honest node V Ch that entered consensus with an opinion of
1. Since V Ch is honest, it must possess vca, along with
the corresponding UCERT (as no other vote code vcb can
be active at the same time for this ballot). Again, because
V Ch is honest, it will follow the protocol and reply with a
well formed RECOVER-REPLY. Additionally, the existence
of UCERT guarantees that any malicious replies can be safely
identified and discarded.
At the end of this algorithm, each node submits the resulting
set of voted 〈serial-no, vote-code〉 tuples to each BB node,
which concludes its operation for the specific election.
F. Voter
We expect the voter, who has received a ballot from EA,
to know the URLs of at least fv + 1 VC nodes. To vote,
she picks one part of the ballot at random, selects the vote
code representing her chosen option, and loops selecting a VC
node at random and posting the vote code, until she receives a
valid receipt. After the election, the voter can verify two things
from the updated BB. First, she can verify her cast vote code
is included in the tally set. Second, she can verify that the
unused part of her ballot, as “opened” at the BB, matches the
copy she received before the election started. This step verifies
that the vote codes are associated with the expected options
as printed in the ballot. Finally, the voter can delegate both of
these checks to an auditor, without sacrificing her privacy; this
is because the cast vote code does not reveal her choice, and
because the unused part of the ballot is completely unrelated
to the used one.
G. Bulletin Board
A BB node is a pubic repository of election-specific in-
formation. By definition, it can be read via a public and
anonymous channel. Writes, on the other hand, happen over
an authenticated channel, implemented with PKI originating
from the voting system. BB nodes are independent from each
other; a BB node never directly contacts another BB node.
Readers are expected to issue a read request to all BB nodes,
and trust the reply that comes from the majority. Writers are
Algorithm 1 Vote Collector algorithms
1: procedure ON VOTE(serial-no, vote-code) from source:
2: if SysT ime() between start and end
3: b :=locateBallot(serial-no)
4: if b.status == NotVoted
5: l := ballot.VerifyVoteCode(vote-code)
6: if l 6= null
7: b.UCERT := {} ⊲ Uniqueness certificate
8: sendAll(ENDORSE〈serial-no, vote-code〉)
9: wait for (Nv − fv) valid replies, fill b.UCERT
10: b.status := Pending
11: b.used-vc := vote-code
12: b.lrs := {} ⊲ list of receipt shares
13: sendAll(VOTE P〈serial-no, vote-code, l.share〉)
14: wait for (Nv − fv) VOTE P messages, fill b.lrs
15: b.receipt := Rec(b.lrs)
16: b.status := Voted
17: send(source, b.receipt)
18: else if b.status == Voted AND b.used-vc == vote-code
19: send (source, ballot.receipt)
20: procedure ON VOTE P(serial-no, vote-code, share,UCERT) from
source:
21: if UCERT is not valid
22: return
23: if SysT ime() between start and end
24: b :=locateBallot(serial-no)
25: if b.status == NotVoted
26: l := ballot.VerifyVoteCode(vote-code)
27: if l 6= null
28: b.status := Pending
29: b.used-vc := vote-code
30: b.lrs.Append(share)
31: sendAll(VOTE P(serial-no, vote-code, l.share) )
32: else if b.status == Voted AND b.used-vc == vote-code
33: b.lrs.Append(share)
34: if size(b.lrs) >= Nv − fv
35: b.receipt := Rec(b.lrs)
36: b.status := Voted
37: function BALLOT::VERIFYVOTECODE(vote-code)
38: for l = 1 to ballot lines do
39: if lines[l].hash == h(vote-code||lines[l].salt) return l
return null
also expected to write to all BB nodes; their submissions are
always verified, and explained in more detail below.
After the setup phase, each BB node publishes its initial-
ization data. During election hours, BB nodes remain inert.
After the voting phase, each BB node receives from each VC
node, the final vote-code set and the shares of msk. Once it
receives fv + 1 identical final vote code sets, it accepts and
publishes the final vote code set. Once it receives Nv − fv
valid key shares (again from VC nodes), it reconstructs the
msk, decrypts all the encrypted vote codes in its initialization
data, and publishes them.
At this point, the cryptographic payloads corresponding to
the cast vote codes are made available to the trustees. Trustees,
in turn, read from the BB subsystem, perform their individual
calculations and then write to the BBs; these writes are verified
by the trustees keys, generated by the EA. Once enough
trustees have posted valid data, the BB node combines them
and publishes the final election result.
We intentionally designed our BB nodes to be as simple
as possible for the reader, refraining from using a Replicated
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State Machine, which would require readers to run algorithm-
specific software. The robustness of BB nodes comes from
controlling all write accesses to them. Writes from VC nodes
are verified against their honest majority threshold. Further
writes are allowed only from trustees, verified by their keys.
Finally, a reader of our BB nodes should post her read
request to all nodes, and accept what the majority responds
with (fb + 1 is enough). We acknowledge there might be
temporary state divergence (between BB nodes), between the
time a writer finishes updating one BB node, and until he
updates another. However, given our thresholds, this should
be only momentary, alleviated with simple retries. Thus, if
there is no reply backed by a clear majority, the reader should
retry until there is such a reply.
H. Trustees
After the end of election, each trustee fetches all the election
data from the BB subsystem and verifies the validity of the
election data. For each ballot, there are two possible valid
outcomes: i) one of the A/B parts are voted, ii) none of the
A/B parts are voted. If both A/B parts of a ballot are marked
as voted, then the ballot is considered as invalid and should
be discarded. Similar, trustees also discard those ballots where
more than maximum allowed commitments in an A/B part are
marked as voted. In case (i), for each encoded option com-
mitment in the voted part, Trusteeℓ submits its corresponding
share of the opening of the commitment to the BB; for each
encoded option commitment in the unused part, Trusteeℓ
computes and posts the share of the final message of the
corresponding zero knowledge proof, showing the validity of
those commitments; meanwhile, those commitments marked
as voted are collected to a tally set Etally. In case (ii), for each
encoded option commitment in both parts, Trusteeℓ submits
its corresponding share of the opening of the commitment to
the BB. Finally, denote D(ℓ)tally as Trusteeℓ’s set of shares of
option encoding commitment openings, corresponding to the
commitments in Etally. Trusteeℓ computes the opening share
for Esum as Tℓ =
∑
D∈D
(ℓ)
tally
and then submits Tℓ to each BB
node.
I. Auditors
Auditors are participants of our system who can verify the
election process. The role of the auditor can be assumed by
voters or any other party. After election end time, auditors read
information from the BB and verify the correct execution of
the election, by verifying the following: a) within each opened
ballot, no two vote codes are the same; b) there are no two
submitted vote codes associated with any single ballot part;
c) within each ballot, no more than one part has been used;
d) all the openings of the commitments are valid; e) all the
zero-knowledge proofs that are associated with the used ballot
parts are completed and valid;
In case they received audit information (an unused ballot
part and a cast vote code) from voters who wish to delegate
verification, they can also verify: f) the submitted vote codes
are consistent with the ones received from the voters; g) the
openings of the unused ballot parts are consistent with the
ones received from the voters.
IV. SECURITY OF D-DEMOS
In this Section, we describe at length the security properties
that D-DEMOS achieves under the threat model described
in Section III-C. Specifically, we show that our distributed
system achieves liveness and safety, as well as end-to-end
verifiability and voter privacy at the same level of [28]1.
We use m, n to denote the number of options and vot-
ers respectively. We denote by λ the cryptographic security
parameter and we write negl(λ) to denote that a function is
negligible in λ. We assume the following security guarantees
for the underlying cryptographic tools:
1) The probability that an adversary running in λ steps
forges digital signatures is no more than negl(λ).
2) There exists a constant c < 1 s.t. the probability that
an adversary running in O(2λc) steps breaks the hiding
property of the option-encoding commitments is no more
than negl(λ).
A. Liveness
To prove the liveness our DBB guarantees, we assume (I)
an upper bound δ on the delay of the delivery of messages
and (II) an upper bound ∆ on the drift of all clocks (see Sec-
tion III-C2). Furthermore, to express liveness rigorously, we
formalize the behavior of honest voters regarding maximum
waiting before vote resubmission as follows:
Definition 1 ([d]-patience). Let V be an honest voter that
submits her vote at some VC node when Clock[V ] = T . We
say that V is [d]-patient, when the following condition holds: If
V does not obtain a receipt by the time that Clock[V ] = T+d,
then she will blacklist this VC node and submit the same vote
to another randomly selected VC node.
Using Definition 1, we prove the liveness of our e-voting
system in the following theorem:
Theorem 1 (Liveness). Let A be an adversary against D-
DEMOS under the model described in Section III-C, where
assumptions I,II in Section III-C2 hold and A corrupts up to
fv < Nv/3 VC nodes. Let Tcomp be the worst-case running
time of any procedure run by the VC nodes and the voters
respectively during the voting protocol. Let Tend denote the
election end time. Define
Twait := (2Nv + 4)Tcomp + 12∆+ 6δ .
Then, the following conditions hold:
1) Every [Twait]-patient voter that is engaged in the voting
protocol by the time that Clock[V ] = Tend−(fv+1)·Twait,
will obtain a valid receipt.
2) Every [Twait]-patient voter that is engaged in the voting
protocol by the time that Clock[V ] = Tend − y · Twait,
1In [28], the authors use the term voter privacy/receipt-freeness, but they
actually refer to the same property.
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where y ∈ [fv], will obtain a valid receipt with more
than 1− 3−y probability.
Proof. Let V be a [Twait]-patient voter initialized by the
adversary A when Clock = Clock[V ] = T . We will compute
an upper bound on the time required for an honest responder
V C node to issue a receipt to V . This bound will be derived
by the time upper bounds that correspond to each step of the
voting protocol, as described in Sections III-E and III-F, taking
also into account the ∆ upper bound on clock drifts and the
δ upper bound on message delivery. In Table I, we provide
the advance of these upper bounds at the global clock and
the internal clocks of V and V C, so that we illustrate the
description of the computation described below.
Upon initialization, V ’s internal clock is synchronized with
the global clock at time Clock = Clock[V ] = T . After at
most Tcomp steps, V submits her vote (serial-no, vote-code) at
internal clock time: Clock[V ] = T + Tcomp, hence at global
clock time: Clock ≤ T +∆.
Thus, V C will receive the vote of V at internal time
Clock[V C] ≤ T + Tcomp + 2∆ + δ. Then, V C performs at
most Tcomp steps to verify the validity of the vote before it
broadcasts its an ENDORSE request to the other VC nodes by
global clock time Clock ≤ T+Tcomp+2∆+δ+(Tcomp+∆) =
T + 2Tcomp + 3∆ + δ.
All the other honest VC nodes (Nv − fv − 1 in total) will
receive V C’s ENDORSEMENT request by global clock time:
Clock ≤ T + 2Tcomp + 3∆ + 2δ, which implies that the time
at their internal clocks is at most T + 2Tcomp + 4∆ + 2δ.
Upon receiving the request, all the honest VC nodes will
verify if vote-code has never been endorsed before and if
so, they respond with an ENDORSEMENT message after at
most Tcomp steps. The global clock at that point is at most
Clock = (T + 2Tcomp + 4∆ + 2δ) + Tcomp + ∆ = T +
3Tcomp+5∆+2δ. Therefore, V C will obtain the other honest
VC nodes’ ENDORSE messages at most when Clock[V C] =
(T + 3Tcomp + 5∆+ 2δ) + ∆ + δ = T + 3Tcomp + 6∆+ 3δ.
In order to determine the uniqueness certificate UCERT
for V ’s vote, V C has to verify up to Nv − 1 messages
(as the fv malicious VC nodes may also send arbitrary
messages). Since the message verification and the UCERT
generation require (Nv−1)·Tcomp and Tcomp steps respectively
, V C will broadcast its receipt share at global clock time
Clock ≤ (T+3Tcomp+6∆+3δ)+(Nv−1)·Tcomp+Tcomp+∆ =
T + (Nv + 3)Tcomp + 7∆+ 3δ.
All the other honest VC nodes will receive V C’s receipt
share by global clock time: Clock ≤ T + (Nv + 3)Tcomp +
7∆+4δ, which implies that the time at their internal clocks is
at most T +(Nv +3)Tcomp +8∆+4δ. Then, they will verify
V C’s share and broadcast their shares for V ’s vote after at
most Tcomp steps. The global clock at that point is no more
than Clock = T +(Nv+3)Tcomp +8∆+4δ+(Tcomp+∆) =
T + (Nv + 4)Tcomp + 9∆+ 4δ.
Therefore, V C will obtain the other honest VC nodes’
shares at most when Clock[V C] = T + (Nv + 4)Tcomp +
9∆ + 4δ + (∆ + δ) = T + (Nv + 4)Tcomp + 10∆ + 5δ and
will process them in order to reconstruct the receipt for V . In
order to collect Nv − fv − 1 receipt shares that are sufficient
for reconstruction, V C may have to perform up to Nv − 1
receipt-share verifications, as the fv malicious VC nodes may
also send invalid messages. This verification requires at most
(Nv−1) ·Tcomp steps. Taking into account the Tcomp steps for
the reconstruction process, we conclude that V C will finish
computation by global time
Clock = T + (Nv + 4)Tcomp + 10∆+ 5δ+
+ (Nv − 1)Tcomp + Tcomp +∆ =
= T + (2Nv + 4)Tcomp + 11∆+ 5δ.
Finally, V will obtain the receipt after at most δ delay
from the moment that V C finishes computation. Taking into
consideration the drift on V ’s internal clock, we have that if
V is honest and has not yet obtained a receipt by the time that
Clock[V ] =
(
T + (2Nv + 4)Tcomp + 11∆+ 5δ
)
+∆+ δ =
= T + (2Nv + 4)Tcomp + 12∆+ 6δ = T + Twait,
then, being [Twait]-patient, she can blacklist V C and resubmit
her vote to another VC node. We will show that the latter
fact implies conditions 1 and 2 in the statement of the theorem:
Condition 1: since there are at most fv malicious VC nodes,
V will certainly run into an honest VC node at her (fv+1)-th
attempt (if reached). Therefore, if V is engaged in the voting
protocol by the time that Clock[V ] = Tend − (fv + 1) · Twait,
then she will obtain a receipt.
Condition 2: if V has waited for more than y·Twait time and
has not yet received a receipt, then it has run at least y failed
attempts in a row. At the j-th attempt, V has
fv − (j − 1)
Nv − (j − 1)
probability to randomly select one of the remaining fv−(j−1)
malicious VC nodes out of the Nv − (j − 1) non-blacklisted
VC nodes. Thus, the probability that V runs at least y failed
attempts in a row is
y∏
j=1
fv − (j − 1)
Nv − (j − 1)
=
y∏
j=1
fv − (j − 1)
3fv + 1− (j − 1)
< 3−y.
Therefore, if V is engaged in the voting protocol by the time
that Clock[V ] = Tend − y · Twait, then the probability that she
will obtain a receipt is more than 1− 3−y.
B. Safety
Our safety theorem is stated in the form of a contract
adhered by the VC subsystem. Namely, the following safety
theorem proves the gurantee that the recorded-as-cast feedback
of D-DEMOS provides for every honest voter that obtained a
valid receipt at the voting protocol.
Theorem 2 (Safety). Let A be an adversary against D-
DEMOS under the model described in Section III-C that
corrupts up to fv < Nv/3 VC nodes, up to fb < Nb/2 BB
nodes and up to Nt−ht out-of Nt trustees. Then, every honest
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Step Time upper bounds at each clock
Clock Clock[V ] Clock[V C] honest VC nodes’ clocks
V is initialized T T T +∆ T +∆
V submits her vote to V C T + Tcomp +∆ T + Tcomp T + Tcomp + 2∆ T + Tcomp + 2∆
V C receives V ’s ballot T + Tcomp +∆+ δ T + Tcomp + 2∆ + δ T + Tcomp + 2∆+ δ T + Tcomp + 2∆ + δ
V C verifies the validity of
V ’s ballot and broadcasts an
ENDORSE message
T + 2Tcomp + 3∆ + δ T + 2Tcomp + 4∆+ δ T + 2Tcomp + 2∆ + δ T + 2Tcomp + 4∆ + δ
All the other honest VC
nodes receive V C’s
ENDORSE message
T + 2Tcomp + 3∆ + 2δ T + 2Tcomp + 4∆ + 2δ T + 2Tcomp + 4∆+ 2δ T + 2Tcomp + 4∆ + 2δ
All the other honest VC
nodes verify the validity of
the ENDORSE message and
respond with an
ENDORSEMENT message
T + 3Tcomp + 5∆ + 2δ T + 3Tcomp + 6∆ + 2δ T + 3Tcomp + 6∆+ 2δ T + 3Tcomp + 4∆ + δ
V C receives the
ENDORSEMENT messages
of all the other honest VC
nodes
T + 3Tcomp + 5∆ + 3δ T + 3Tcomp + 6∆ + 3δ T + 3Tcomp + 6∆+ 3δ T + 3Tcomp + 6∆ + 3δ
V C verifies the validity of all
the Nv − 1 received messages
until it obtains Nv − fv valid
ENDORSEMENT messages
T + (Nv + 2)Tcomp +
7∆ + 3δ
T + (Nv + 2)Tcomp +
8∆ + 3δ
T + (Nv + 2)Tcomp +
6∆ + 3δ
T + (Nv + 2)Tcomp +
8∆+ 3δ
V C forms UCERT certificate
and broadcsts its share and
UCERT
T + (Nv + 3)Tcomp +
7∆ + 3δ
T + (Nv + 3)Tcomp +
8∆ + 3δ
T + (Nv + 3)Tcomp +
6∆ + 3δ
T + (Nv + 3)Tcomp +
8∆+ 3δ
All the other honest VC
nodes receive V C’s broadcast
share and UCERT
T + (Nv + 3)Tcomp +
7∆ + 4δ
T + (Nv + 3)Tcomp +
8∆ + 4δ
T + (Nv + 3)Tcomp +
8∆ + 4δ
T + (Nv + 3)Tcomp +
8∆+ 4δ
All the other honest VC
nodes verify the validity of
UCERT and V ’s share and
broadcast their shares
T + (Nv + 4)Tcomp +
9∆ + 4δ
T + (Nv + 4)Tcomp +
10∆ + 4δ
T + (Nv + 4)Tcomp +
10∆ + 4δ
T + (Nv + 4)Tcomp +
8∆+ 4δ
V C receives all the other
honest VC nodes’ shares
T + (Nv + 4)Tcomp +
9∆ + 5δ
T + (Nv + 4)Tcomp +
10∆ + 5δ
T + (Nv + 4)Tcomp +
10∆ + 5δ
T + (Nv + 4)Tcomp +
10∆ + 5δ
V C verifies the validity of all
the Nv − 1 received
messages until it obtains
Nv − fv valid shares
T + (2Nv + 3)Tcomp +
11∆ + 5δ
T + (2Nv + 3)Tcomp +
12∆ + 5δ
T + (2Nv + 3)Tcomp +
10∆ + 5δ
T + (2Nv + 3)Tcomp +
12∆ + 5δ
V C reconstructs and V ’s
receipt and sends it to V
T + (2Nv + 4)Tcomp +
11∆ + 5δ
T + (2Nv + 4)Tcomp +
12∆ + 5δ
T + (2Nv + 4)Tcomp +
10∆ + 5δ
T + (2Nv + 4)Tcomp +
12∆ + 5δ
V obtains her receipt T + (2Nv + 4)Tcomp +
11∆ + 6δ
T + (2Nv + 4)Tcomp +
12∆ + 6δ
T + (2Nv + 4)Tcomp +
12∆ + 6δ
T + (2Nv + 4)Tcomp +
12∆ + 6δ
Table I
TIME UPPER BOUNDS AT Clock,Clock[V ], Clock[V C] AND OTHER HONEST VC NODES’ CLOCKS AT EACH STEP OF THE INTERACTION OF V WITH
RESPONDER V C . THE GRAYED CELLS INDICATE THE REFERENCE POINT OF THE CLOCK DRIFTS AT EACH STEP.
voter who receives a valid receipt from a VC node, is assured
her vote will be published on the honest BB nodes and included
in the election tally, with probability at least
1− negl(λ) −
fv
2−64 − fv
.
Proof. Let V be an honest voter. Then, A’ strategies on
attacking safety (i.e. provide a valid receipt to V but force
the VC subsystem to discard V ’s ballot), is captured by either
one of the two following cases:
Case 1. Produce the receipt without being involved in a complete
interaction with the VC subsystem (i.e. with at least fv+1
honest VC nodes).
Case 2. Provide a properly reconstructed receipt via a complete
interaction with the VC subsystem.
Let E1 (resp. E2) be the event that Case 1 (resp. Case 2)
happens. We study both cases:
Case 1. In this case, A must produce a receipt that matches
V ’s ballot with less than Nv − fv shares. A may achieve this
by either one of the following ways:
(i). A attempts to guess the valid receipt; If A succeeds, then
it can force the VC subsystem to consider V ’s ballot not
voted as no valid UCERT certificate will be generated
for V ’s ballot. Since there are at most fv malicious VC
nodes, the adversary has at most fv attempts to guess the
receipt. Moreover, the receipt is a randomly generated
64-bit string, so after i attempts, A has to guess among
(264 − i) possible choices. Therefore, the probability
succeeds is no more than
fv−1∑
i=0
1
2−64 − i
≤
fv
2−64 − fv
.
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(ii). A attempts to reconstruct the receipt using all the
malicious VC nodes’ receipt shares. These are at most
fv, so by the information theoretic security of the
(Nv − fv, Nv)-VSS scheme the probability of success
for A is no better than above (A can only perform a
random guess).
(iii). A attempts to produce fake UCERT certificates by
forging digital signatures of other nodes. By the security
of the digital signature scheme, this attack has negl(λ)
success probability.
By the above, we have that
Pr[A wins |E1] ≤
fv
2−64 − fv
+ negl(λ) . (1)
Case 2. In this case, by the security arguments stated in
Section III-E (steps - ), every honest VC node will include the
vote of V in the set of voted tuples. This is because a) it locally
knows the valid (certified) vote-code for V accompanied
by UCERT or b) it has obtained the valid vote-code via a
RECOVER-REQUEST message. Recall that unless there are
fake certificates (which happens with negligible probability)
there can be only one valid vote-code for V .
Consequently, all the honest VC nodes will forward the
agreed set of votes (hence, also V ’s vote) to the BB nodes.
By the fault tolerance threshold for the BB subsystem, the fb
honest BB nodes will publish V ’s vote. Finally, the ht out-of
Nt honest trustees will read V ’s vote from the majority of BB
nodes and include it in the election tally. Thus, we have that
Pr[A wins |E2] = negl(λ) . (2)
By Eq. (1),(2), if V obtains a valid receipt, then his vote will be
published on the honest BB nodes and included in the election
tally, with probability at least
1− negl(λ) −
fv
2−64 − fv
.
Theorem 4 provides guarantee that the honest voter’s vote
will be recorded-as-cast by the system on an individual level.
Using Theorem 4, we prove the following corollary about the
“universal” safety of the receipt-based feedback mechanism of
D-DEMOS.
Corollary 1. Let n be the number of voters. Let A be an
adversary against D-DEMOS under the model described in
Section III-C that corrupts up to fv < Nv/3 VC nodes, up to
fb < Nb/2 BB nodes and up to Nt − ht out-of Nt trustees.
Then, the probability that A achieves in excluding the vote of
at least one honest voter that obtained a valid receipt from
the election tally is no more than
nfv
2−64 − fv
+ negl(λ) .
Proof. The proof is straightforward by taking a union bound
on the probability of successful attack on the safety of every
single honest voter and the upper bound fv
2−64 − fv
+ negl(λ)
on A’s success probability derived by Theorem 4.
C. End-to-end Verifiability
We adopt the end-to-end (E2E) verifiability definition
in [28], modified accordingly to our setting. Namely, we
encode the options set {option1, . . . , optionm}, where the
encoding of optioni is an m-bit string which is only in the
i-th position. Let F be the election evaluation function such
that F (optioni1 . . . , optionin) is equal to an m-vector whose
i-th location is equal to the number of times optioni was voted.
Then, we use the metric d1(·, ·) derived by the 1-norm, ‖ · ‖1
scaled to half, i.e.,
d1 : Z
m
+ × Z
m
+ −→ R
(w,w′) 7−→ 12 ·
∑n
i=1 |wi − w
′
i|
to measure the success probability of the adversary with
respect to the amount of tally deviation d and the number
of voters that perform audit θ.
We model end-to-end verifiability via a game between a
challenger and an adversary. The adversary starts by selecting
the identities of the voters, options, VC nodes, BB nodes and
trustee nodes identities for given parameters n,m,Nv, Nb, Nt.
In [28], the adversary corrupts the EA which manages the
elestion setup, the vote collection, and the tally computation.
Analogolously, the adversary in D-DEMOS now fully controls
the EA, all the trustees, and all the VC nodes. Moreover, [28]
assumes a consistent BB. In our model, we guarantee a this
BB by restricting the adversary to statically corrupt a minority
of the BB nodes.
At the voting phase, it manages the vote casting of every
voter. For each voter, the adversary may choose to corrupt
her or to allow the challenger to play on her behalf. In the
second case, the adversary provides the option selection that
the honest voter will voter. The adversary finally posts the
election transcript to the BB. Finally, we make use of a vote
extractor algorithm E (not necessarily running in polynomial-
time) that extracts the non-honestly cast votes. The adversary
will win the game provided that there is a subset of θ honest
voters that audit the result successfully but the deviation of
the tally is bigger than d; the adversary will also win in case
the vote extractor fails to produce the option selection of the
dishonest voters but still, θ honest voters verify correctly. The
attack game is specified in detail in Figure 2.
Definition 2 (E2E Verifiability). Let 0 < ǫ < 1 and
n,m,Nv, Nb, Nt ∈ N polynomial in λ with θ ≤ n. Let Π be an
e-voting system with n voters, Nv VC nodes, Nb BB nodes and
Nt trustees. We say that Π achieves end-to-end verifiability
with error ǫ, w.r.t. the election function F , a number of θ
honest successfull voters and tally deviation d if there exists
a (not necessarily polynomial-time) vote extractor E such that
for any PPT adversary A it holds that
Pr[GA,E,d,θe2e-ver (1
λ,m, n,Nv, Nb, Nt) = 1] ≤ ǫ.
Theorem 3. Let n,m,Nv, Nb, Nt, θ, d ∈ N where 1 ≤ θ ≤ n.
Then, D-DEMOS run with n voters, m options, Nv VC nodes,
Nb BB nodes and Nt trustees achieves end-to-end with error
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E2E Verifiability Game GA,E,d,θe2e-ver (1λ,m, n,Nv, Nb, Nt)
1) A on input 1λ, n,m,Nv, Nb, Nt, chooses a list
of options {option1, . . . , optionm}, a set of voters
V = {V1, . . . , Vn}, a set of VC nodes VC =
{VC1, . . . ,VCNv}, a set of BB nodes BB =
{BB1, . . . ,BBNb}, and a set of trustees T =
{T1, . . . , TNt}. It provides the challenger Ch with all
the above sets.
Throughout the game, A controls the EA, all the VC
nodes and all the trustees. In addition, A may corrupt
a fixed set of up to BB nodes, denoted by BBsucc. On
the other hand, Ch plays the role of all the honest BB
nodes.
2) A and C engage in an interaction where A schedules
the vote casting executions of all voters. For each
voter Vℓ, A can either completely control the voter
or allow C to operate on Vℓ’s behalf, in which case
A provides C with an option selection optioniℓ . Then,
C casts a vote for optioniℓ , and, provided the voting
execution terminates successfully, C obtains the audit
information auditℓ on behalf of Vℓ.
Let Vsucc be the set of honest voters (i.e., those
controlled by C) that terminated successfully.
3) Finally, A posts a version of the election transcript
infoj in every honest BB node BBj /∈ BBcorr.
The game returns a bit which is 1 if and only if the
following conditions hold true:
1. |BBcorr| < ⌊Nb/2⌋ (i.e., the majority of the BB nodes
remain honest).
2. ∀BBj ,BBj′ /∈ BBcorr : infoj = infoj′ := info (i.e, the
data posted in all honest BB nodes are identical).
3. |Vsucc| ≥ θ (i.e., at least θ honest voters terminated).
4. ∀ℓ ∈ [n] : if Vℓ ∈ Vsucc then Vℓ verifies succesfull,
when given (info, auditℓ) as input.
and either one of the following two conditions:
5.a. if ⊥ 6= 〈optioniℓ〉Vℓ /∈Vsucc ← E(info, {auditℓ}Vℓ∈Vsucc)
then
d1
(
Result(info), F (optioni1 . . . , optionin)
)
≥ d,
5.b. ⊥ ← E(info, {auditℓ}Vℓ∈Vsucc).
Figure 2. The E2EVerifiability Game between the challenger C and the
adversary A using the vote extractor E.
2−θ+2−d, w.r.t. the election function F , a number of θ honest
successfull voters and tally deviation d.
Proof. Without loss of generality we can assume that every
party can read consistently the data published in the majority
of the BB nodes, as otherwise the adversary fails to satisfy
either conditions 1 or 2 of the E2E verifiability game.
We first construct a vote extractor E for D-DEMOS as
follows: E takes input as the election transcript, info and
a set of audit information {auditℓ}Vℓ∈Vsucc . If info is not
meaningful, then E outputs ⊥. Let B ≤ |V˜| be the num-
ber of different serial numbers that appear in {auditℓ}Vℓ∈V˜.
Otherwise, E (arbitrarily) arranges the voters in Vℓ ∈ Vsucc
and the serial numbers not included in {auditℓ}Vℓ∈Vsucc as
〈V Eℓ 〉ℓ∈[n−|Vsucc|] and 〈tagEℓ 〉ℓ∈[n−B] respectively. Next, for
every ℓ ∈ [n − |Vsucc|], E extracts optioniℓ by brute force
opening and decrypting (in superpolynomial time) all the
committed and encrypted BB data, or sets optioniℓ as the zero
vector, in case Vℓ’s vote is not published in the BB. Finally,
E outputs 〈optioniℓ〉Vℓ /∈Vsucc .
We will prove the E2E verifiability of D-DEMOS based
on E. Assume an adversary A that wins the game
GA,E,d,θe2e-ver (1
λ,m, n,Nv, Nb, Nt). Namely, A breaks E2E ver-
ifiability by allowing at least θ honest successful voters and
achieving tally deviation d.
Let Z be the event that A attacks by making at least one of
the option-encoding commitments associated with some cast
vote-code invalid (i.e., it is in tally set Etally but it is not
a commitment to some candidate encoding). Since there are
at least θ honest and succesful voters, the min-entropy of the
collected voters’ coins is at least θ. By min-entropy Schwartz-
Zippel Lemma [28, Lemma 1] and following the lines of [28,
Theorem 2], we have that when the challenge is extracted
from voters’ coins of min-entropy θ, the verification of the
Chaum-Pedersen zero-knowledge proofs used in D-DEMOS
for committed ballot correctness in the BB is sound except
for some probability error 2−θ. Therefore, since there is at
least one honest voter that verifies, we have that
Pr[GA,E,d,θe2e-ver (1
λ,m, n,Nv, Nb, Nt) = 1 ∧ Z] ≤ 2
−θ . (3)
Now assume that Z does not occur. In this case, the vote
extractor E will output the indended adversarial votes up to
permutation. Thus, the deviation from the intended result that
A achieves, derives only by miscounting the honest votes. This
may be achieved by A in two different possible ways:
• Modification attacks. When committing to the infor-
mation of some honest voter’s ballot part A changes the
vote-code and option correspondence that is printed in
the ballot. This attack will be detected if the voter does
chooses to audit with the modified ballot part (it uses the
other part to vote). The maximum deviation achieved by
this attack is 1 (the vote will count for another candidate).
• Clash attacks. A provides y honest voters with ballots
that have the same serial number, so that the adversary
can inject y − 1 votes of his preference in the y − 1
“empty” audit locations in the BB. This attack is suc-
cessful only if all the y voters verify the same ballot on
the BB and hence miss the injected votes that produce
the tally deviation. The maximum deviation achieved by
this attack is y − 1.
We stress that if Z does not occur, then the above two attacks
are the only meaningful2 for A to follow. Indeed, if (i) all
2By meaningful we mean that the attack is not trivially detected. For
example, the adversary may post malformed information in the BB nodes
but if so, it will certainly fail at verification.
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zero knowledge proofs are valid, (ii) all the honest voters are
pointed to a unique audit BB location indexed by the serial
number on their ballots, and (iii) the the committed in this
BB location information matches the vote-code and option
association in the voters’ unused ballot parts, then by the
binding property of the commitments, all the tally computed
by the commitments included in Etally will decrypt to the
actual intended result.
Since the honest voters choose the used ballot parts at
random, the success probability of x deviation via the modifi-
cation attack is (1/2)x. In addition, the success probability to
clash y honest voters is (1/2)y−1 (all y honest voters choose
the same version to vote). As a result, by combinations of
modification and clash attacks, A’s success probability reduces
by a factor 1/2 for every unit increase of tally deviation.
Therefore, the upper bound of the success probability of A
when Z does not occur is
Pr[GA,E,d,θe2e-ver (1
λ,m, n,Nv, Nb, Nt) = 1 | ¬Z] ≤ 2
−d . (4)
By Eq. (3), (4), we have that
Pr[GA,E,d,θe2e-ver (1
λ,m, n,Nv, Nb, Nt) = 1] ≤ 2
−θ + 2−d .
D. Voter Privacy
Our privacy definition is extends the one used in [28] to
the distributed setting of D-DEMOS. Similarly, voter privacy
is defined via a Voter Privacy game as depicted in Figure 3.
The game, denoted as GA,S,φpriv (1λ, n,m,Nv, Nb, Nt), is played
between an adversary and a challenger, and we say the
adversary wins the game if and only if it returns 1. During
the game, the adversary A first chooses a list of options, a set
of voters, a set of VC nodes, a set of BB nodes, and a set
of trustees, of size m,n,Nv, Nb, Nt respectively. We require
that the EA is destroyed after setup, whereas the adversary
may control the entire VC subsystem, up to fb < Nb/2 BB
nodes and up to ft < Nt/3 trustees. The adversary may
also corrupt up to φ voters. The adversary then instructs
the honest voters to vote according to either one of two
alternative ways under the restriction that election tally is the
same for both ways. The system achieves voter privacy if the
adversary cannot distinguish which alternative was followed
by the honest voters.
Definition 3 (Voter Privacy). Let 0 < ǫ < 1 and
n,m,Nv, Nb, Nt ∈ N. Let Π be an e-voting system with n
voters, m options awith n voters, Nv VC nodes, Nb BB nodes
and Nt trustees w.r.t. the election function f . We say that Π
achieves voter privacy with error ǫ for at most φ corrupted
voters, if there is a PPT voter simulator S such that for any
PPT adversary A:
∣∣Pr[GA,S,φpriv (1λ, n,m,Nv, Nb, Nt) = 1]− 1/2
∣∣ = negl(λ).
Theorem 4. Assume there exists a constant c, 0 < c < 1 such
that for any 2λc -time adversary A, the advantage of breaking
the hiding property of the underlying commitment scheme is
Voter privacy Game GA,S,φpriv (1λ, n,m,Nv, Nb, Nt)
1) A on input 1λ, n,m, k, chooses a list of options
P = {P1, . . . , Pm}, a set of voters V = {V1, . . . , Vn},
a set of trustees T = {T1, . . . , Vk}, a set of
VC nodes {VC1, . . . ,VCNv} a set of BB nodes
{BB1, . . . ,BBNt}. It provides Ch with all the above
sets.
Throughout the game, A corrupts all the VC nodes a
fixed set of fb < Nb/3 BB nodes and a fixed set of
ft < Nt/3 trustees. On the other hand, Ch plays the
role of the EA and all the non-corrupted nodes.
2) Ch engages with A to prepare the election following
the Election Authority protocol.
3) After that, Ch chooses a bit value b ∈ {0, 1}.
4) The adversary A and the challenger Ch engage in an
interaction where A schedules the voters which may
run concurrently. For each voter Vℓ ∈ V, the adversary
chooses whether Vℓ is corrupted:
• If Vℓ is corrupted, then Ch provides the credential
sℓ to A, who will play the role of Vℓ to cast the
ballot.
• If Vℓ is not corrupted, then A provides two option
selections 〈option0ℓ , option1ℓ〉 to the challenger Ch
which operates on Vℓ’s behalf, voting for option
optionbℓ. The adversary A is allowed to observe
the network trace. After cast a ballot, the chal-
lenger Ch provides to A: (i) the audit information
αℓ that Vℓ obtains from the protocol, and (ii)
if b = 0, the current view of the internal state of
the voter Vℓ, viewℓ, that the challenger obtains
during voting, or if b = 1, a simulated view of
the internal state of Vℓ produced by S(viewℓ).
5) The adversary A and the challenger Ch produce the
election tally, running the Trustee protocol. A is al-
lowed to observe the network trace of that protocol.
6) Finally, A using all information collected above (in-
cluding the contents of the BB) outputs a bit b∗.
Denote the set of corrupted voters as Vcorr and the set of
honest voters as V˜ = V \ Vcorr. The game returns a bit
which is 1 if and only if the following hold true:
(i). b = b∗ (i.e., the adversary guesses b correctly).
(ii). |Vcorr | ≤ φ (i.e., the number of corrupted voters is
bounded by φ).
(iii). f(〈option0ℓ 〉Vℓ∈V˜) = f(〈option
1
ℓ〉Vℓ∈V˜) (i.e., the elec-
tion result w.r.t. the set of voters in V˜ does not leak
b).
Figure 3. The Voter privacy Game between the adversary A and the challenger
Ch using the simuator S.
Advhide(A) = negl(λ). Let φ = λc
′ for any constant c′ < c.
Then, D-DEMOS run with n voters, m options, Nv VC nodes,
Nb BB nodes and Nt trustees achieves voter privacy for at
most φ corrupted voters.
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Proof. To prove voter privacy, we explicitly construct a sim-
ulator S such that we can convert any adversary A who
can win the privacy game GA,S,φpriv (1λ, n,m, k) with a non-
negligible probability to an adversary B who can break the
hiding assumption of the underlying commitment scheme
within poly(λ) · 2λc
′
<< 2λ
c
time.
Note that the challenger Ch is maintaining a coin b ∈ {0, 1}
and always uses the option optionbℓ to cast the honest voters’
ballots. When n− φ < 2, the simulator S simply outputs the
real voters’ views. When n − φ ≥ 2, consider the following
simulator S. At the beginning of the experiment, S flips a
coin b′ ← {0, 1}. For each honest voter Vℓ, S switches the
vote-codes for option optionbℓ and optionb
′
ℓ . Due to full VC
corruption, A learns all the vote-codes. However, it does not
help the adversary to disdinguish the simulated view from real
view as the simulator only permutes vote-codes. Moreover,
we can show that if A distinguishes the alternative followed
by honest votes, then we can construct an algorithm B that
invokes A and simulates an election execution where it guesses
(i) the corrupted voters’ coins (in 2φ expected attempts) and
(ii) the election tally (in (n+ 1)m expected attempts). Thus,
B finishes a compete simulation with high probability running
in n2(n+ 1)m ·2φ = O(2λc
′
) steps. Namely, B can replace all
the commitments on the BB to commitments of 0, except for
the commitments in one honest voter’s ballot, which commits
to the guessed tally result. By exploiting the distinguishing
advantage of A, B can break the hiding property of the option-
encoding commitment scheme in O(2λc
′
) = o(2λ
c
) steps, thus
leading to contradiction.
V. IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
Implementation. We implement the Election Authority com-
ponent of our system as a standalone C++ application, and all
other components in Java. Whenever we store data structures
on disk, or transmit them over the wire, we use Google
Protocol Buffers [2] to encode and decode them efficiently. We
use the MIRACL library [4] for elliptic-curve cryptographic
operations. In all applications requiring a database, we use the
PostgreSQL relational database system [6].
We build an asynchronous communications stack (ACS) on
top of Java, using Netty [5] and the asynchronous PostgreSQL
driver from [1], using TLS based authenticated channels for
inter-node communication, and a public HTTP channel for
public access. This infrastructure uses connection-oriented
sockets, but allows the applications running on the upper
layers to operate in a message-oriented fashion. We use this
infrastructure to implement VC and BB nodes. We implement
Bracha’s Binary Consensus directly on top of the ACS, and
we use that to implement our Vote Set Consensus algorithm.
We introduce a version of Binary Consensus that operates
in batches of arbitrary size; this way, we achieve greater
network efficiency. We implement “verifiable secret sharing
with honest dealer”, by utilizing Shamir’s Secret Share library
implementation [7], and having the EA sign each share.
Web browser replicated service reader. Our choice to model
the Bulletin Board as a replicated service of non-cooperating
nodes puts the burden of response verification on the reader
of the service; a human reader is expected to manually issue
a read request to all nodes, then compare the responses and
pick the one posted by the majority of nodes. To alleviate
this burden, we implement a web browser extension which
automates this task, as an extension for Mozilla Firefox. The
user sets up the list of URLs for the replicated service. The
add-on 1) intercepts any HTTP request towards any of these
URLs, 2) issues the same request to the rest of the nodes, and
3) captures the responses, compares them in binary form, and
routes the response coming from the majority, as a response
to the original request posted by the user. Majority is defined
by the number of defined URL prefixes; for 3 such URLs, the
first 2 equal replies suffice.
With the above approach, the user never sees a wrong reply,
as it is filtered out by the extension. Also note this process
will be repeated for all dependencies of the initial web page
(images, scripts, CSS), as long at they come from the same
source (with the same URL prefix), verifying the complete
user visual experience in the browser.
Evaluation. We experimentally evaluate the performance of
our voting system, focusing mostly on our vote collection
algorithm, which is the most performance critical part. We
conduct our experiments using a cluster of 12 machines,
connected over a Gigabit Ethernet switch. The first 4 are
equipped with Hexa-core Intel Xeon E5-2420 @ 1.90GHz,
16GB RAM, and one 1TB SATA disk, running CentOS 7
Linux, and we use them to run our VC nodes. The remaining
8 comprise dual Intel(R) Xeon(TM) CPUs @ 2.80GHz, with
4GB of main memory, and two 50GB disks, running CentOS
6 Linux, and we use them as clients.
We implement a multi-threaded voting client to simulate
concurrency. It starts the requested number of threads, each of
which loads its corresponding ballots from disk and waits for
a signal to start; from then on, the thread enters a loop where
it picks one VC node and vote code at random, requests the
voting page from the selected VC (HTTP GET), submits its
vote (HTTP POST), and waits for the reply (receipt). This
simulates multiple concurrent voters casting their votes in
parallel, and gives an understanding of the behavior of the
system under the corresponding load.
We employ the PostgreSQL RDBMS [6] to store all VC
initialization data from the EA. We start off by demonstrating
our system’s capability of handling large-scale elections. To
this end, we generate election data for referendums, i.e.,
m = 2, and vary the total number of ballots n from 50 million
to 250 million (note the 2012 US voting population size was
235 million). We fix the number of concurrent clients to 400
and cast a total of 200,000 ballots, which are enough for our
system to reach its steady-state operation. Figure 5a shows the
throughput of the system declines slowly, even with a five-fold
increase in the number of eligible voters.
In our second experiment, we explore the effect of m,
i.e., the number of election options, on system performance.
We vary the number of options from m = 2 to m = 10.
Each election has a total of n = 200, 000 ballots which we
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Figure 4. Latency (4a, 4d) and throughput graphs (4b, 4e) of the vote collection algorithm vs. the number of VC nodes. Figures (4c and 4f) illustrate
throughput versus the number of concurrent clients. First row illustrates LAN setting plots. Second row illustrates WAN setting plots. Election parameters are
n = 200,000 and m = 4.
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Figure 5. Throughput graphs of the vote collection phase versus the number of total election ballots n (5a) and the number of total election options m (5b).
A total of 200,000 ballots were cast by 400 concurrent clients on 4 VC nodes. Figure 5c illustrates the duration of all system phases. Results depicted are for
4 VCs, n = 200,000 and m = 4. All these plots are for disk based experiments.
spread evenly across 400 concurrent clients. As illustrated in
Figure 5b, our vote collection protocol manages to deliver
approximately the same throughput regardless of the value of
m. Notice that the only extra overhead m induces during vote
collection, is the increase in the number of hash verifications
during vote code validation, as there are more vote codes per
ballot.
Next, we evaluate the scalability of our vote collection pro-
tocol by varying the number of vote collectors and concurrent
clients. We eliminate the database, by caching the election data
in memory and servicing voters from the cache, to measure
the net communication and processing costs of our voting
protocol. We vary the number of VC nodes from 4 to 16,
and distribute them across the 4 physical machines. Note that,
co-located nodes are unable to produce vote receipts via local
messages only, since the Nv−fv threshold cannot be satisfied,
i.e., cross-machine communication is still the dominant factor
in receipt generation. For election data, we use the dataset with
n = 200, 000 ballots and m = 4 options.
In Figures 4a and 4b, we plot the average response time
and throughput of our vote collection protocol, versus the
number of vote collectors, under various concurrent client
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scenarios. Results illustrate an almost linear increase in the
client-perceived latency, for all concurrency scenarios, up to
13 VC nodes. From this point on, when four logical VC nodes
are placed on a single physical machine, we notice a non-linear
increase in latency. We attribute this to the overloading of the
memory bus, a resource shared among all processors of the
system, which services all (in-memory) database operations.
In terms of overall system throughput, however, the penalty
of tolerating extra failures, i.e., increasing the number of
vote collectors, manifests early on. We notice an almost 50%
decline in system throughput from 4 to 7 VC nodes. However,
further increases in the number of vote collectors lead to a
much smoother, linear decrease. We repeat the same exper-
iment by emulating a WAN environment using netem [27],
a network emulator for Linux. We inject a uniform latency
of 25ms (typical for US coast-to-coast communication [3])
for each network packet exchanged between vote collector
nodes, and present our results in Figures 4d and 4e. A simple
comparison between LAN and WAN plots illustrates our
system manages to deliver the same level of throughput and
average response time, regardless of the increased intra-VC
communication latency. Finally, in Figures 4c and 4f, we plot
system throughput versus the number of concurrent clients, in
LAN and WAN settings respectively. Results show our system
has the nice property of delivering nearly constant throughput,
regardless of the incoming request load, for a given number
of VC nodes.
Finally, in Figure 5c, we illustrate a breakdown of the
duration of each phase of the complete voting system (D-
DEMOS), versus the total number of ballots cast. We assume
immediate phase succession, i.e., the vote collection phase
ends when all votes have been cast, at which point the vote
set consensus phase starts, and so on. The “Push to BB
and encrypted tally” phase is the time it takes for the vote
collectors to push the final vote code set to the BB nodes,
including all actions necessary by the BB to calculate and
publish the encrypted result. The “Publish result” phase is the
time it takes for Trustees to calculate and push their share
of the opening of the final tally to the BB, and for the BB to
publish the final tally. Note that, in most voting procedures, the
vote collection phase would in reality last several hours and
even days as stipulated by national law (see Estonia voting
system). Thus, looking only at the post-election phases of the
system, we see that the time it takes to publish the final tally
on the BB is quite fast.
Overall, although we introduced Byzantine Fault Tolerance
across all phases of a voting system (besides setup), we
demonstrate it achieves high performance, enough to run real-
life elections of large electorate bodies.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We have presented the world’s first complete, state-of-
the-art, end-to-end verifiable, distributed voting system with
no single point of failure besides setup. The system allows
voters to verify their vote was tallied-as-intended without the
assistance of special software or trusted devices, and external
auditors to verify the correctness of the election process.
Additionally, the system allows voters to delegate auditing
to a third party auditor, without sacrificing their privacy.
We provided a model and security analysis of our voting
system. Finally, we implemented a prototype of the integrated
system, measured its performance and demonstrated its ability
to handle large scale elections.
As future work, we plan to expand our system to k-out-of-m
elections.
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